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from Conflict and its Consequences 
for Development Interventions 
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Executive Summary 
This briefing paper focuses on the relationship of law to governance, in fragile and conflict-affected 
states that are attempting to transition from violent protracted social conflict.  The paper is intended 
to set out a broad conceptual framework of the relationship between law and governance as it 
relates to peacebuilding attempts to reconstruct governance post-conflict.  The paper draws on and 
provides a guide to relevant research which provided the underpinning of the Political Settlements 
Research Programme, and is being developed under its auspices by a consortium of five 
organisations (www.politicalsettlements.org).     
This briefing paper sits alongside a second briefing paper on law and governance (O’Rourke, Briefing 
Paper 5, 2015 http://www.politicalsettlements.org/research/briefing-notes/) focusing on the case 
study of women’s social mobilisation which illustrates many of the relationships set out below. 
 
 
1.   Our Framing understandings. 
The following are the understandings from the political settlement research 
programme which frame the briefing note. 
a.  Law.  We understand law in a socio-legal sense as an area which has 
some autonomy from politics as normally understood, but which is 
closely shape by and shaping of the political and social contexts in 
which it operates.  Our interest is in understanding the social effects of 
law on the political sphere, and our socio-legal approach extends to 
trying to use socio-legal methodology for understanding the role and 
effects of law socially. 
 
b. International and domestic law.  We also understand law as operating 
in two different registers and sites, which are increasingly intermingled:  
international law as found in both hard (e.g. treaty) and soft (e.g. 
guidelines) forms as an inter-state commitments, but commitments 
which increasingly seek to impact on the internal make-up of the state; 
and domestic law where constitutional frameworks provide the entire 
foundation for formal governance arrangements, but which also often 
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appeal to universal ideals.  However, these two registers are now as this briefing 
note point out, increasingly intermingled.   
 
c. Political settlements and peace processes.   We also contend that the relationship 
of law to governance has a specific context in countries attempting to transition 
from conflict, and it is this context that we address in this briefing paper.   In 
countries attempting structured peace processes and transitions, often three types 
of transition are attempted simultaneously in a fairly short timescale which lead to a 
distinctive set of dilemmas and problems for law, rule of law, and governance:  
 
• a transition from war to peace 
 
• a transition from exclusive political settlements to more inclusive ones with a 
new configuration of elite power and sometimes accentuated roles for civil 
society  
 
• an economic transition  
 
 
2. Conceptualising the link between law and governance in general terms.  Law and 
governance are closely linked in the following ways.   
 
a. Constitutions provide the framework for the legal and political institutions through 
which government takes place.  They provide: 
 
• legal ‘power-maps’ for how power will be held and exercised 
• a legal framework for accountability, often enforceable by apex courts 
• a legalised text which embodies the underlying political settlement or elite-level 
pact from which any political community flows 
• rights and safeguards for individuals from abuses of power by political actors and 
institutions 
 
b. Public institutions of governance are themselves also creatures of law, operating 
according to law and sometimes even having secondary law-making functions. 
 
c. Good government depends on a legal platform of both criminal law and civil law, to 
create the environment – here law’s key role is to provide background norms that 
enable horizontal interactions. 
  
d. International law increasingly impacts on, and increasingly even regulates 
governance at the state level.  This regulation is diverse and multifarious, including: 
 
• International legal regulation of political change processes (including peace 
settlements, coup d’état, or other forms of regime change), which attempts to 




• International legal requirements for human rights to be protected at the domestic 
level.  Human rights directly impact on the internal governance arrangements of 
states 
 
• International legal requirements for ‘inclusion’ both in change processes and in the 
terms of the new political settlement itself 
 
• A range of diverse international bodies shape domestic governance in what have 
been termed ‘transnational global administrative spaces’ which impact on domestic 
governance (see for example, Venice Commission of Council of Europe which now 
acts (when requested) well beyond Europe in giving opinions on constitutions) 
 
3. The distinctiveness of the law-governance relationship in conflict-affected states 
We suggest that the relationship between law and governance is distinctive in conflict and post-
conflict settings.   
e. Law is often deeply implicated in conflict. An exclusive political settlement means 
that institutions of law and governance are often understood as ‘owned’ by one side 
in the conflict, and as a tool of conflict.  Conflicts are often dealt with through 
emergency law regimes and tweaked criminal law, denial of human rights is often a 
cause and a symptom of conflict and legal institutions are not understood as 
autonomous from those they are supposed to hold to account.  As a result: 
 
• Law and legal institutions as themselves needing rehabilitated post-conflict: law as 
both subject and object of change.  Policing functions need to be separated from 
army functions, discriminatory laws need repealed, and respect for rule of law needs 
to be built  
 
• A new concept of ‘shared ownership’ of governance institutions and particularly 
justice institutions needs to be instituted post-conflict with wholesale reform of 
criminal justice, the judiciary and the police and security services to ensure equal 
representation of previously excluded groups  
 
• International law tends to play a heightened role both during conflict and in post-
conflict settings, because it offers ‘neutral’ benchmarking standards that are 
independent to any of the parties to the conflict.  Also, even the most rights-denying 
governments have often formally signed up to international human rights standards 
which therefore have some traction 
 
• Those outside both the conflict political settlement, but also the brokered peace 
agreement’s political settlement, often use appeals to norms and in particular 
international legal norms to demand inclusion in peace-making and constitution-
making processes, and to demand certain substantive outcomes from the new 
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governance arrangements (for example – provision of equality, or prohibition of 
impunity)   
 
• International norms also have become a focal  point for transnational mobilisation of 
civil society and so using these norms for domestic lobbying brings an element of 
outside resource to marginalised civil society groups, by which they can increase 
their influence 
 
4. Unusual legal institutions.  As a result of these conditions post-conflict and transitional 
settings often have unusual legal phenomenon (and unusual governance structures) which 
pose a distinctive set of challenges.  These can include:  
 
a. Off-the-peg criminal codes (East Timor, Kosovo) and internationalise domestic law 
with little local expertise. 
 
b. International involvement in domestic legal institutions (e.g. international judges on 
Apex courts (Bosnia, Philippines), international law enforcers (IFOR in Bosnia), 
international or hybrid criminal courts (Rwanda, former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone). 
 
c. Interim Constitutions – often operating bearing a burden of providing a coherent 
power-map while also operating as peace agreements with a heavy conflict 
resolution ambition.  These attempt to pave the way for more permanent 
Constitutions (sometimes successfully sometimes not).  See Interim Constitution 
Report. 
 
d. Multiple and overlapping legal structures which are not always coherent as a whole, 
but which reflect important negotiation dynamics: for example, overlaid human 
rights institutions (state, regional, human rights chambers and ombudsmen whose 
functions and remit are not always distinct), or multiple mechanisms to deal with 
the past with overlapping mandates (see Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and the Sierra Leone Special Criminal Court). 
 
e. Rapid institutional development with a wide range of simultaneous reform projects, 
leading to ‘consultation fatigue’ and depletion of civil society as staff shift from non-
governmental to governmental spheres. 
 
f. Truth commissions or other legal mechanisms to deal with the past, which operate 
for time-limited periods and have complicated relationships with ‘ordinary’ legal 
institutions such as courts and police. 
 
g. Courts, police and other mechanisms often also becoming vehicles for parties and 
civil society to press claims as to accountability for the conflict, in ways which distort 




5. Unusual governance.  This unusual legal institutional patterning is coupled with unusual 
governance arrangements.  These include, notably complex power-sharing arrangements 
which attempt to create a new political settlement – that is a new framework for power 
among elites.  Whereas governance arrangements in settled contexts assume a) an agreed 
political community, (b) an agreed territory and (c) an agreed set of governance institutions 
which flow from the agreed political community, often post-conflict there is very little 
agreement to any of these things.  Accordingly institutional forms are designed that attempt 
to encapsulate a very low-level agreement to ‘agree to disagree’ and to use shared 
institutions to continue to work out that disagreement.  This leads to a number of distinctive 
governance dilemmas:  
 
a. How to reconcile commitments to elite inclusion to commitments to rule of law and 
wider forms of participation (including when and who to amnesty for past 
atrocities).  
 
b. How to work complex conceptual and territorial divisions of power, that aim for 
forms of power-dividing, that often cut across traditional thinking as to how best to 
achieve effective and efficient government.  These often include forms of veto. 
 
c. How to ensure that non-elites or other marginalised groups are included in 
governance structures whose main aim is to accommodate the conflict’s 
protagonists. 
 
d. How to reckon with informal power structures that often continue through the 
transition in fairly invisible ways, that have capacity to subvert the ostensible 
commitments to good government and peaceful co-existence. 
 
e. Navigating the relationship between law and governance in the midst of what are 
complex attempts to construct a new political settlement in a short period of time 
through a structured internationalised peace process.   
 
6. Significant controlling factors.  Based on our research, the following factors we suggest are 
critical to distinguishing between post-conflict settings, and the complexity of the 
reconstructive task: 
 
a. Whether the post-conflict state had some past background as a rule of law state.  
Such a backdrop makes the task somewhat easier than where legal and political 
institutions for good governance are being constructed with little recent past history 
of these institutions having functioned coherently. 
 
b. The scale of the conflict, and in particular whether any human capacity for law and 
legal institutions exists.  If, for example, the scale of the conflict means that judiciary 
have fled the country, police are not in place, and prisons are not operating 




c. The balance of power between the conflict parties.  If one party remains more 
powerful, they may have capacity to prevent or destabilise proposed reforms.  
Similarly, however, a balance of power in which each side can essentially veto the 
other side’s proposed changes, can frustrate progress.  The point remains: the 
balance of power is important to what can be achieved. 
 
d. The strength and capacity of civil society.  A robust and informed civil society can 
make a real different in bringing knowledge as to what types of accountability 
mechanisms are needed to address grievances on the ground, and in anticipating 
how parties may want to resist change. 
 
e. Past institutional history and experience.  Past institutional history and experience is 
important to local senses of what can be made work and what has been tried and 
discredited. 
 
f. The scale of internationalisation and commitment to resources and ‘monitoring’ that 
internationals bring.   
 
g. The regional human rights system, which may play a role in adjudicating on various 
aspects of the transitional governance arrangements (e.g. amnesty provision) 
 
7. Challenges for development support.  The following persistent problems appear in the 
literature in this area: 
 
a. The complex task of establishing ‘legitimacy’ (whatever that is).   
 
b. The need for on-going enforcement of change. 
 
c. The complex relationship between liberal democracy and elite deals. 
 
d. The pressure for accountability of international interveners. 
 
e. The lack of experience of international actors in dealing with institutional 
development as a ‘battleground’ whereby each party uses reform to try to win 
through the peace, what they did not win through the war. 
 
f. Lack of integration of economic transition factors.  Development and reconstruction 
of governance institutions may cut across economic adjustment imperatives, 
because they require large amounts of public expenditure. 
 
8. Some important counter-intuitive pointers as to effective intervention to support law and 
governance structures post-conflict.  There are many lessons which could and have been 
drawn for those seeking to intervene effectively in structured transitions from conflict so 
as to support good law and government.  We have chosen just a few that we view as 
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sound but counter-intuitive to the normal ways in which international interveners tend to 
work.  
 
a. Economic adjustment must often be secondary to legal and political reconstruction  
 
b. International enforcement remains necessary to all progress, and progress is slow.  
In particular, international interveners should analyse where spoilers may come 
from, and anticipate how best to support those committed to the peace 
settlement to deal with them.  
 
c. It can be useful to live with mess, such as overlapping institutional provision, 
without trying to rationalise for rationalisation sake, as this provision may be vital 
to keeping one of the parties ‘on board’ 
 
d. It is important that international interveners understand and anticipate the way in 
which governance reform will itself be a battlefield between the parties – good 
post-conflict analysis of how different proposed reforms are understood to impact 
on each side’s calculation of its zero-sum interests. 
 
e. It is important for international interveners to understand the limits of their own 
political constraints, and not to take on tasks which are going to be political and 
even confrontational, if they do not have the requisite political will or resources to 
complete these tasks. 
 
f. However, while interveners need to understand the political constraints of the 
local context, and of their own capacity, they should not always accept such 
constraints.  Effective intervention will look for opportunities to move beyond the 
political constraints to support institutional transformation. 
 
g. International actors should be understanding of civil society post-conflict collapse 
– it is normal and structural, as actors move in and out of official institutions, and 
funding sources dry up.  Proactive support to civil society should be considered as 
a post-conflict necessity.  
 
h. Redistributive economic policies based on achieving inter-group equality are 
important to success, and often achieved by a combination of targeted strategies, 
and by concentrating on rich – poor equalities which disproportionately help 
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University Press)  
Ní Aoláin, Fionnuala (2006) ‘Political Violence and Gender in Times of Transition’ 15 Colombia 
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Social mobilisation to influence new governance and legal institutions.  Citizen’s perceptions of 
state legitimacy in post conflict states 
O’Rourke, Catherine (2013) Gender Politics in Transitional Justice (Routledge) 
O’Rourke, Catherine (2015) Briefing Paper 5, Political Settlements Research Programme at 
http://www.politicalsettlements.org/research/briefing-notes/  
Conciliation Resources, Accord on Legitimacy and peace processes, http://www.c-
r.org/accord/legitimacy-and-peace-processes/what-legitimacy-and-why-does-it-matter-peace  
 
See also case studies on  
Somalia (constitutions): http://www.c-r.org/accord/legitimacy-and-peace-processes/somalia-
legitimacy-provisional-constitution 
Yemen (national dialogue): http://www.c-r.org/accord/legitimacy-and-peace-processes/yemen-
national-dialogue-conference-managing-peaceful-change 
Afghanistan (local governance and political settlement): http://www.c-r.org/accord/legitimacy-and-
peace-processes/afghanistan-local-governance-national-reconciliation-and 
Fiji (women's empowerment vis a vis the constitutional reform process). This last is taken from CR 
Accord on cross-border peacebuilding and looks at civil society attempts to improve security and 
trade governance in the MRU: http://www.c-r.org/accord/legitimacy-and-peace-processes/fiji-
constitutional-process-view-fiji-women-s-rights-movement 
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